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ABSTRACT
Pro-active message’s DTN are based on the usage of mobile code to obtain messages that contain their own routing code.
This architecture allows applications to use the same network in different ways. The keystone of this type of heterogeneous
network is a collection of contextual and application-related information that it is stored in every node and accessed by
the messages’ routing code. Access to that information must be protected in order to make feasible the whole architecture,
the operation of the network has to be secure, and attacks of information poisoning have to be avoided. We propose an
Identity based Access Control system for Pro-active Message’s DTN based on tools that are available in DTN networks,
like symmetric key encryption and hashes. Our system grants confidentiality and integrity to the contextual information
and solves the question of messages needing to use distributed information stored in nodes to route properly. The proof-of-
concept of Identity based Access Control in a certain kind of application demonstrates the feasibility of the proposal. The
comparison between our proposal and other access control systems shows that Identity based Access Control is the only
system that fits well with the special characteristics of Pro-active message’s DTN. Copyright c© 2012 John Wiley & Sons,
Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) have a set of unique
characteristics that make it very difficult to find a
routing protocol that can be applied successfully in any
situation. Some of them are the non-contemporary of
communications, the existence of significant delays and
mobility patterns that allow nodes to be isolated from their
neighbours during variable lapses of time. Due to that,
there is not a de facto routing standard broadly extended
and used. This makes DTN routing a challenge.
In an environment where the topology of the network
changes very quickly and the nature and characteristics of
the applications that use it are very different, the one-fit-all
solution could be a chimera. Flexibility is a key aspect, and
the only proposal that tries to obtain it, Haggle [1], uses
a dynamic approach with many pros and one important
contra: the utilisation of an array of routings algorithms
makes the deployment very hard and costly in any scenario
where the set of applications grows, or simply changes,
over time.
In response to that, we propose a model in which mobile
code is used to obtain messages that contain its own routing
code. This way we can offer applications the opportunity
to differentiate themselves from one another and use the
same network of different, specific, forms. From now on,
there will be no need to treat different messages the same
way.
.
Using a routing code carried by the messages to provide
a blind routing where all applications dispose of the
same, or no, information to make decisions would not be
useful. It is necessary to let the applications use their own
information in order to achieve the desired flexibility. This
information should be application-oriented and designed
to allow messages to decide the best route based on the
specific criteria of each application.
Without the appropriate security model, this whole
model is unusable. We cannot rely on a network if
any malicious message could access, delete or modify
all the information stored in nodes, thereby disturbing
the proper operation of one or more applications. If
the information used during routing becomes poisoned,
then the whole architecture will loose all its purpose.
Therefore, it is crucial to dispose of a system that secures
the information and prevents possible damaging attacks
occurring, a system that makes feasible this new approach.
The obvious solution for this problem is called access
control. However, almost all access control proposals are
thought to protect resources as an abstract term. This
approach is general and can be used in many scenarios,
with many different objectives, but the drawback of that
generalization is that it restricts the tools that can be used to
protect resources. For example, access control can be used
to protect a file, the usage of a printer or the usage of the
network, but we cannot cypher a printer or sign the usage
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of the network. Besides, access control systems usually
rely on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [2], a requirement
that cannot be met in a Delay Tolerant Network.
Therefore, an access control system that would grant
only messages authorized by the application access to the
information owned by that application is required. This
system has to take into account:
• The system has to be capable of operating in a
DTN environment, considering all of its unique
characteristics.
• Every application must decide exactly the messages
that are authorized to access to the information
it manages. All other messages’ access to this
information must be prohibited.
• The system has to grant access to authorized
messages fast enough to not diminish their routing
opportunities.
We propose Identity based Access Control for Pro-
active Message’s system, a secure access control system
for messages with routing code focused on protecting a
particular resource: structured and organized information
used by messages during routing. In our model, each
application is an abstract entity that can use a set of
different mobile codes to route messages to its destination.
These codes usually work together with a common
objective. The network provides distributed application-
related information used by the mobile codes in order to
communicate between them, gather context-aware data or
use it during routing, store intermediate results or receive
instructions or parameters provided by the application.
Our proposal brings feasibility to the whole network
architecture by granting confidentiality and integrity of
information. In order to achieve this, we implement access
control using two different hash functions and symmetric
key encryption when a mobile code requests access
information. The hash functions are applied to the code
itself and are used to recover the cryptographic key needed
to decrypt the information.
1.1. Structure of this paper
The following sections of this paper are structured this
way: Section 2 explains the environment in which our
research is focused, the new routing model of Pro-active
message’s based DTN. Section 3 provides an overview
of the state of the art of access control for mobile code
and related work available in the literature. Section 4
studies the best way to identify and authenticate which
messages are authorized to access the information. Section
5 formally describes our proposal of identity based access
control, while Section 6 addresses the main security
aspects and issues related to our proposal. Section 7 shows
an application based on our proposal over a DTN routing
problem and evaluates its performance and feasibility.
Finally, section 8 concludes this paper and provides some
future lines of research.
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2. PRO-ACTIVE MESSAGES, A
PARADIGM’S SHIFT
In this section, we will explain the environment in which
our research has been undertaken. We will explain first
Delay Tolerant Networks, and how the traditional approach
deals with the challenges they present. Then we will focus
on Pro-active messages as our central concept of a new
Delay Tolerant Networks paradigm and we will study the
utility of providing application related information to be
used during routing. Finally, we will explain the three
phases of operation of Pro-active message’s based DTN.
2.1. Delay Tolerant Networks
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) [3] are networks where
the low connectivity rates, the high and variable delays,
and the impossibility to establish simultaneous end-to-
end paths make communications very challenging. Delay
Tolerant Networking is usually used in regions where the
communication networks are unavailable or spotty, where
the lack of a fixed infrastructure and the mobility of the
nodes of the network allow them to be isolated from their
neighbours during variable lapses of time.
The cornerstone of DTN is the store-carry-and-forward
strategy [4], which is a way for turning a weakness as
the mobility of the nodes into a strength. Using this
strategy, nodes store and carry their messages until they
opportunistically establish contacts with other nodes of
the network, and they make use of these unpredictable
contacts to forward the messages. This process is repeated
until the messages eventually reach their destination. The
simultaneous end-to-end paths that cannot be established
are somehow substituted by a mix between physical
distances travelled by nodes carrying messages and node-
to-node transmissions when other nodes are contacted.
DTN routing protocols focus on the decision making
when two or more nodes establish contact. What messages
should be forwarded? How many copies of every message
should be created? Is there a message not worth sending?
What messages should be dropped last? etc. . . These
questions are addressed by routing protocols, who try to
ask these questions to maximize the performance of the
network.
The traditional DTN approach consists in selecting a
routing protocol and deploying it in every node of the
network. This way all nodes behave the same way in terms
of routing, and most important, all messages are treated
equally all over the network.
2.2. Pro-active message based DTN
Our proposal revolves around the concept of changing the
traditional approach to routing. Instead of using routing
algorithms deployed in every node of the network, we
move the routing code from the nodes to the messages,
using mobile code as is suggested in [5, 6]. In this
paradigm, nodes provide the necessary infrastructure to let
the messages decide the way towards its destination, but
the own message carries the routing algorithm that decides
how to route it. The type of DTN where this research
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is focused is called Pro-active message’s DTN. The key
concept of this networks is the Pro-active message. As
depicted in Figure 1, a Pro-active message contains four
fields:
Source address Destination address
Content
Routing Code
Figure 1. Schema of fields of a Pro-active message, a message
that carries its own routing code.
1. Source address: address of the node that sent the
message.
2. Destination address: address of the node where the
message has to be delivered.
3. Content: the data from the application.
4. Routing Code: mobile code that has to be executed
in every node the message arrives to in order to
choose where the message should be forwarded
to. Routing code executes a function f which, as
defined below, operates above the list of the current
neighbours and a set of contextual information and
returns the subset of neighbours where the message
has to be forwarded to.
forwardTo = f (neighbourList, information)
forwardTo ⊆ neighbourList
2.2.1. Application driven routing
The most important advantage of Pro-active message’s
DTN approach is that applications themselves can use
the network any way they want. It is important to note
that every application knows its own needs better than
any other, and similarly, the best routing decision for an
application can be different to the best routing decision
for another application and nobody but the applications
themselves can know that. Consequently, by using Pro-
active messages, applications can take their own optimal
routing decisions.
Very different applications can coexist inside the
same network. However, Pro-active messages cannot take
optimal decisions without having enough information. In
this model, the usage of an application-related information
is crucial. Routing cannot be driven by applications unless
they can decide everything about the information they want
to use. The way to achieve this is to let the applications use
ontologies to structure their information. Then, the same
information is seen simultaneously in two very different
ways: while the network sees it as a stream of bytes
the applications see it as a structured knowledge. In our
proposal of Pro-active message’s based DTN, this routing
information is stored in nodes in the Routing Information
DataBase (RIDB). Eventually, nodes can exchange entries
of the RIDB between them in order to allow applications
to spread their updates of the entries.
Therefore, Pro-active messages must access their
application related information in every node of their
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route. Pro-active messages must also be able to modify the
information, updating its value in a way that can be known
or understood by the application itself.
2.2.2. Operation of the network
During the operation of the Pro-active message’s
based DTN, we can differentiate between three phases,
depending on the type of the messages sent and the
actions performed by the users, the applications and the
administrators of the network.
1. Deployment phase: nodes become initialized,
and no Pro-active messages are sent. Network
administrators must be able to access all the
nodes. Ideally, deployment should be applied only
once before users and applications start using the
network.
2. Standard phase: Pro-active messages sent by users
are the only kind of message that travels through
the network. Nodes can become isolated during
lapses of time, network topography varies quickly
and there are not simultaneous end-to-end paths
between nodes. This is the most common phase.
3. Update phase: applications update their informa-
tion entries and nodes exchange these entries be-
tween them in order to spread the updates of the
routing information. Applications share the network
with users during this phase. Therefore, Pro-active
messages continue travelling through the network.
This phase starts every time an application decides
to share its update and ends when all nodes have
received it or after a determined amount of time.
Deployment 
phase
Standard 
phase
Update 
phase
Figure 2. Flow diagram of the three phases.
Figure 2 shows the flow chart of the three phases
mentioned above, the deployment phase is the initial phase
of the network, followed by the standard and update phases
which form an endless cycle.
3. STATE OF THE ART
In this section, we introduce the concept of mobile
code related with access control. Following, we present
some of the most representative research community’s
solutions for access control for mobile code and analyse
their characteristics. We focus especially on those
characteristics that can become problematic in a DTN.
3.1. Access Control for Mobile Code
Mobile code [7] is code sourced from remote, possibly
unknown or untrusted systems or networks, but executed
locally on the system. Some examples of mobile code are
mobile agents [8], downloadable code, executable content,
active capsules, remote code, etc. . . Due to its own nature,
mobile code does not fit well with the traditional access
control approach that runs any process with the same user
privileges or capabilities that executed it.
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In the following paragraphs, we provide an overview
of some of the ideas and proposals from the research
community currently used to solve the access control for
mobile code problem.
3.2. Role-Based Access Control
Role-Based policies [9], also referred to as role-based
security, is the most extended and used approach in
medium and large organizations [10]. Role-based policies
regulate users’ access to the information depending on the
activities they carry out in the system. Roles are defined on
the basis of the actions associated with a concrete working
activity. Then, instead of giving authorizations to each user
every time they want to access a resource, users are given
authorization to adopt roles. Finally, each requested access
is allowed or denied depending on the roles adopted by the
user, Figure 3 illustrates this process.
Login
(ID, Password, 
certificate or other)
Role 
Assignment RoleBased
Access
Control
Allow 
or 
Deny
Roles/groups table Policy
Action
Resource
RoleID
Figure 3. Schema of Role Based Access Control.
It is important to note that Role Based Access Control
(RBAC) is designed to be used inside a closed system.
Using it in a DTN is problematic because the access
control module needs a fair role assignment. This is hard
to achieve if we have to separate the access control module
and the role assignment module into different nodes that
could become unlinked them during the access control
process. As a result, although RBAC does not use any
cryptographic tool, it can not be used in a DTN schema
without using cryptography to secure transmissions.
3.3. Access Control based on trust
Cryptographic tools such as digital signature [11] are used
by software authors to sign the code which is distributed
together with the author’s digital certificate and signature.
When the code arrives a host and is about to be executed,
the signature is validated, and then the system grants the
code access to all requested resources exclusively in the
case that the author of the code is trustworthy.
There are lots of proposals designed to enhance this
trust model. These proposals are based on the assumption
that it is impossible for a user to know all the world’s
trustworthy software developers and trust their programs.
Trust management [12] tries to establish trust relationships
between users and developers that do not know each other.
The key point is not to try to establish the authorship of
the code but establish the credentials of the code instead
[13]. An example of Access Control based on trust is
KeyNote Trust Management System [14], where users
delegate into trusted credential issuers that are expected
to have direct or indirect relationships with potential
requesters. Other proposals [15] have dynamically updated
trust relationships as more information is collected from
code execution or use recommendations from peers to
calculate the scale of the trust on the unknown requester
[16].
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3.4. Security-by-contract
Security-by-contract [17] goes a step further and uses
digital signature to link together the code, not only with
the author but also with a contract [18] that specifies the
actions the code will perform during its execution. This
model also relies on trusting the code author, but the idea
is that only permissions that are needed are granted, or at
least, permissions that the author considers necessary for
the code (open and write a file, create a socket, access
a database, send packets to a specific domain, etc. . . ).
Thanks to security-by-contract, users are able to know
exactly not only who wrote a program, but also what
actions will be executed if the contract is accepted.
Of course, security-by-contract needs to use cryptogra-
phy to bind the code to a contract in order to guarantee
the authenticity and the origin of the contract. Otherwise, a
malicious entity could write its own contract and use it to
gain access to a resource from unauthorized code.
Additionally, if an application decides to delete or
revoke the permissions given to a code to access some
information, it can not be done with this system. When a
contract is attached to a signed code, there is no way to
revoke or change it unless the certificate used to sign the
contract is revoked.
3.5. History-based access control
History-based access control for mobile code, such as
Deeds [19], gather and store information about the actions
executed and the resources accessed by the mobile code.
Subsequently, this historical information is used to link
the process to several pre-defined profiles (editor, browser,
terminal, etc. . . ). Finally, those profiles are used to decide
about the requests made processes (e.g. a program opens
a local file is labelled as “editor”, but when the same
program tries to open a socket, the creation of the socket is
not allowed because it is an action allowed for “browsers”
but not for “editors”).
This approach is extremely specific to control the
execution of code downloaded from an unknown source
towards Internet, or another similar environment, and it
is hardly applicable to other situations. History-based
Access Control does not match with the requirements of
the environment. This proposal is designed to work in
scenarios where the resources are very different and the
only danger occurs when two or more are used together, or
one after another. In Pro-active message’s DTN, the only
action performed by codes usually is access information,
and a “safe” or “dangerous” behaviour does not exist
(based on the information accessed by the code).
3.6. Common characteristics
It is important to note that most of the access control
proposals for mobile code are thought and focused on
solving two specific cases: foreign code executed inside
the browser, and execution of code downloaded from an
unknown source from the Internet. As a result, they usually
assume some weaknesses derived from the nature of the
open environment in which they are designed to operate
8 Security Comm. Networks 2012; 00:2–26 c© 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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(e.g. users cannot know all programs they will execute, the
amount of different programs and software developers is
enormous and keeps growing, etc. . . ).
Another important aspect to consider is that security is,
in almost most cases, cryptographically based on Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI), a very extended model that
fits well with Internet’s characteristics but not with DTN
characteristics. The access to a trusted third party, to the
certificate’s repository or to revocation lists cannot be
available in a DTN, additionally, the distribution of the
certificates among nodes remains unsolved [20, 3, 21, 22,
23]. The reason for this is that PKI is based on assumptions
such as permanent point-to-point connectivity or the small
delays at the link layer that cannot be applied in DTN.
4. IDENTITY OF PRO-ACTIVE
MESSAGES
In this section, we will see the specific necessities of the
Pro-active messages identification’s process and the need
of that identification in order to provide access control to
a given information. Then, we will discuss different ways
of message authentication, and we will study the pros and
cons of our solution.
4.1. Identification of Pro-active messages
Supposing that a message arrives a node and requests
access to the information of the application A. It is
necessary to identify and authenticate that message in
order to decide if it is authorized to access the information
about this application.
Since the data field can contain any value, the quantity
of different Pro-active messages that an application can
create is infinite. However, during routing, the data field
is meaningless, it does not play any role until the message
is delivered to its destination.
We have to consider a hypothetical attacker that alters a
Pro-active message modifying its routing code that tries
to, using a forged routing code, access or modify A’s
information. This is one of the points we want to fight in
our research, to develop an access control system that fits
with this situation.
4.2. Authentication of Pro-active messages
In general, the authentication process can be seen from
four different perspectives.
1. To find out something anything that nobody else can
know, for example, a password.
2. To find out something that nobody else has, for
example, a key.
3. To find out how to do something in a particular way,
for example, a signature.
4. To have a unique characteristic, for example, a
fingerprint or a DNA chain.
Here we will examine why the first three approaches are
not valid when considering the authentication problem of
the Pro-active messages in a DTN environment.
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The first two points can be analysed together. A software
entity cannot differentiate between having something and
knowing something. A message cannot travel with physical
elements as a key or a card, but it can travel with any
data, as a password or a digital key. The usage of portable
passwords has an important drawback: the theft of a
password compromises immediately the whole system,
because from that moment, the attacker could use send a
malicious message with the stolen password to access a
protected information from its routing code.
The third approach makes us think directly about the
usage of a well-known cryptographic technique: digital
signature. However, digital signature leans in the PKI, a
schema that can’t be applied in DTN, as we have seen in
Section 3.
We find the solution to our problem in the fourth point,
above. When a routing code tries to access an entry, we
can determine if it is authorized by analysing it. In that
case we are using something that it is inherent to the code,
something that cannot be copied or stolen because it forms
part of what that routing code is. This is an idea previously
pointed out in [24] to manage package distributions of
software.
Using a simile with conventional identity based access
control system, we can say that we analyse the DNA of the
message in order to identify and authenticate it, the routing
code of the message, like the DNA of a living being. This
way, the message does not need to know or have or do
anything, it will be authenticated for what it is.
4.3. Identify code using hash
Messages can use routing codes of different lengths. In
order to use routing code to decide about access control,
it is preferable to manage a fixed-size element. With just a
hash function applied on the routing code, it is possible to
obtain a binary sequence that identifies it and, at the same
time, differentiates it from any other.
Our system uses the hash of the routing code to identify
messages. This way, if a message is intercepted, the only
way a hypothetical attacker could use the obtained data to
access information is to create a message with the obtained
routing code. Regardless, a behaviour like this would not
compromise the security of the system. Note that if the
routing code of the new message is exactly the same of
the original message then it would not cause any malicious
action over the stored information.
5. IDENTITY BASED ACCESS CONTROL
In this section, we will analyse the requisites that our
access control system has to satisfy. Secondly, we will
present the Authorized Hashes Set, the Entries Set and the
algorithms used to add content to these sets. Thirdly, we
will explain the way of using these sets and the algorithms
to achieve an effective access control system. Finally, we
will explain the characteristics of Identity based Access
Control.
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5.1. Notation
For the sake of clarity, we provide Table I, which contains
the notation used to refer to each one of the different
elements that will appear in this and the next Section, and
a brief description of its meaning. From now on, we will
use this notation.
Notation Meaning
i Identifies a message.
ci Routing code of message i.
c′i Routing code forged to replace ci.
j Identifies an application.
Ij
Information of application j stored
in the RIDB.
I ′j An updated version of Ij .
h() and h′() Two different hash functions.
Ek()
Symmetric key encryption function of
algorithm E using key k.
Dk()
Symmetric key decryption function of
algorithm E using key k.
Table I. Notation of all elements used from now on.
5.2. Requirements
The developed system uses the hash value of ci from
each Pro-active message in order to identify it and provide
control access to the protected Information Ij , which is
stored at the custodian. The following requisites need to
be granted:
• The system should grant access to all authorized ci
to information Ij .
• The system should grant secrecy and integrity to
all protected Information Ij . No unauthorized ci (or
other processes) should be able to access or modify
it.
• The system should allow nodes to send entries
between them to spread among the nodes of the
network the updates made by the applications.
• The system should add a minimum impact in
terms of resource’s consumption and execution
time. This is necessary to avoid conflicts with small
connectivity windows, typical in DTN scenarios.
5.3. A system based on two sets
To decide if ci is authorized to access Ij , our proposal is
based in the usage of two sets, the set of entries and the set
of stored information.
Authorized Hashes Set
The Authorized Hashes Set (AHS) is the key element
of our proposal, and it is the only set that has to be deployed
into nodes during the deployment phase. AHS contains a
collection of triplets as explained next:
(j, h′(ci), Eh(ci)(kj)) (1)
Where:
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• j identifies the application to which the Information
Ij belongs, is used to identify the triplet together
with the result of applying a hash algorithm to ci.
• kj is the symmetric key needed to cipher and
decrypt the protected information Ij , and it is
cyphered with E using the result of another hash
algorithm over ci as key.
Entries Set
The Entries Set (ES) is a collection of pairs as follows:
(j, Ekj (Ij)) (2)
Where:
• j identifies the application to which the Information
Ij and allows us to make a quick search of a stored
entry identified by j without trying to decrypt every
entry in the set.
• Ij is the protected information, ciphered using a
symmetric encryption algorithm using a key kj that
is stored in theAHS (see following subsections 5.4
and 5.5 in order to know how the key kj is obtained
and stored).
5.4. Creation of the AHS
When new information Ij has to be stored and protected in
one or more nodes, Algorithm 1 is used to add to theAHS
and ES sets the needed triplets and pairs.
Algorithm 1 Storage of protected information
Input: Ij : Information to be protected.
j: Identifier of the information.
M : Set of messages i with access to Ij .
Output: ∅
1: Generate a random key kj .
2: Cypher Ekj (Ij).
3: Ad to ES the pair (j, Ekj (Ij)).
4: for i ∈M do
5: Obtain routing code ci.
6: Calculate h(ci) and h′(ci).
7: Cypher Eh(ci)(kj).
8: Add (j, h′(ci), Eh(ci)(kj)) to AHS.
9: end for
10: return ∅
5.5. Using the set of entries to control access to
an entry
When a message i arrives to a node and its routing code ci
requests access the Information of application j, Algorithm
2 has to be applied. This algorithm recovers the keys
needed to decrypt that information only if ci is authorized
to access Ij .
5.6. Modification of a protected entry
Algorithm 3 is used when a message i, previously
authorized to access Ij , modifies it and decides to
overwrite Ij with the newer version I ′j .
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Algorithm 2 Access Control
Input: i: Message requesting access to the information.
j: Identifier of the information.
Output: Ij : Information requested, identified by j.
1: Obtain ci from message i.
2: Calculate h′(ci).
3: Search in AHS a triplet that matches with
(j, h′(ci), $ciphered key).
4: Store in $ciphered key the corresponding value.
5: Calculate h(ci).
6: Decrypt Dh(ci)(Eh(ci)($ciphered key)) = kj .
7: Search in ES a pair that matches with
(j, $ciphered info).
8: Store in $ciphered info the corresponding value.
9: Decrypt Dkj (Ekj ($ciphered info)) = Ij .
10: if Ij has been successfully decrypted then
11: return Ij
12: else
13: return ∅
14: end if
5.7. Optimization
Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 are very similar (the first
9 lines are the same). Furthermore, in any situation,
Algorithm 2 (used to access to an entry) has always been
executed before Algorithm 3, which is used to update the
entry. Therefore, Algorithm 3, the most time-consuming
of the three, can be optimized and executed quicker if
certain values (obtained from intermediate calculations by
Algorithm 3 Modification of an entry
Input: i: Message trying to modify the entry.
j: Identifier of the entry.
I ′j : New version of Ij .
Output: true or false.
1: Execute first 9 lines of algorithm 2.
2: if Ij has been successfully decrypted then
3: Cypher Ekj (I
′
j).
4: Remove the pair (j, Ekj (Ij)) from ES.
5: Add the pair (j, Ekj (I
′
j)) to ES.
6: return true
7: else
8: return false
9: end if
Algorithm 2) are kept in the memory for a while. This way
we can avoid executing repeatedly the same operations.
5.8. Characteristics of Identity based Access
Control system
Identity based Access Control system uses two different
hash functions, the output of one of them is used to identify
the subject, and the output of the other is used to cypher
and decrypt the key needed to access the information.
Our proposal uses a discretionary policy, and it is
designed loosely following the guidelines of an access
control list (see Figure 4). This approach consists on
associating each system’s object with all the authorized
subjects that can access it and the actions they can perform
over the object. Subsequently, the list is consulted when a
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subject requests access to an object in order to know if it is
authorized or not.
info
info
File 1
File 2 Alice
John Alice
Bob
R
W
Own,
R, W
Own, 
R
Figure 4. Schema of an Access Control Lists implementation.
Instead of relating the name of every subject with
its permissions in order to allow or deny access to
information, our system relates the identifier of each
subject (the result of a hash function) to the key needed
to decrypt the information (see Figure 5).
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
Info 1
Info 2
info
info
h(John) h(Alice) h(Charlie)
h(Alice) h(Bob)
Figure 5. Schema of Identity based Access Control.
This key can be retrieved only by the proper subject
(because it is encrypted with the result of another hash
function is key). Moreover, the identifier of each piece
of information is related with the encrypted information
itself, therefore, the information can’t be decrypted and
accessed without getting the key.
Using the Identity based Access Control instead of
simply an Access Control List system has two advantages:
it provides security against a certain type of situations
that we need to avoid, such as a remote attack using
routing code forgery, and it allows nodes to spread updates
of routing information securely (see Section 6 for more
details).
5.9. Access Control in Pro-active message’s DTN
We encourage the reader to look at Table II, which
provides a qualitative comparison between our proposal
and other access control systems. Table II is structured
according to the following format: each column references
one of the four compared systems (Identity based Access
Control, Security-by-contract, Role-Based Access Control
and History-based Access Control). Each row of the table
refers to a specific characteristic of access control systems,
chosen based on the needs of the environment in which we
are working.
Because of this comparison, we can conclude that there
are no other systems that fit well with the characteristics
of Delay Tolerant Networks because they are designed to
solve problems in other types of scenarios and present
issues when they have to operate in a Pro-active message’s
DTN. We cannot find any system that improves Identity
based Access Control system in that environment.
6. SECURITY OF THE ACCESS
CONTROL
In this section, we will discuss security offered by our
identity based access control system. With this in mind,
we will analyse three different scenarios. In the first
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Access Control Identity Contract RBAC History-based
System
Cryptographic Hash and Hash and
tools used Symmetric key Digital Signature Nothing Nothing
encryption 7
Distribution Deployment Continuous N/A N/A
of keys 7
Need secure No No Yes No
transmissions 7
Application Yes Yes Yes No
requirements 7
Type of Structured Any resource Any resource Any resource
resource information
State of Cyphered Original state Original state Original state
resource
Initial Platform and sets Platform Platform Platform
Deployment
Add new Add to set Create new Change Change
permissions contract policies profiles
Delete old Remove from set Impossible Change Change
permissions 7 policies profiles
Add a new Change Modify
resource to Add to set Add file policies platform
the system 7
Applicability X 7 7 7
Table II. Comparison between Identity based Access Control and other systems.
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scenario, an attacker tries to create a malicious Pro-active
message that could access a protected information. In the
second scenario, an attacker intercepts an exchange of
routing information between nodes and tries to access
these entries. In the last scenario, an attacker that has
compromised a node tries to access all entries, using the
sets AHS and ES. Finally, we provide some conclusions
about the three scenarios.
6.1. Security against routing code forgery
A remote attacker that wants to compromise the entry Ij
needs to make a Pro-active message i′ with a routing code
c′i that is passed as an authorized code ci in order to access
an entry (see Figure 6).
Authorized 
message
Authorized 
message
Attacker
Malicious 
message
Attacker
Legitimate user
Step 2
Step 1
Objective
Figure 6. Schema of the attack. 1) Attacker intercepts
an authorized message, 2) Attacker generates a malicious
message using the information obtained in the previous step.
The first step of this attack consists of intercepting a
message i with an authorized ci that can access Ij . Then,
the attacker can use the non-secret functions h and h′ to
calculate h(ci) and h′(ci). At this point, the attack will be
successful if the attacker finds a c′i that accomplishes both
h(c′i) = h(ci) and h
′(c′i) = h
′(ci) with c′i 6= ci.
Therefore, the attacker has to realize a double pre-image
attack [25, 26] against two different hash algorithms.
Assuming that h and h′ are in line with the following
statements:
• They’re safe against pre-image attacks. A pre-image
attack consists in finding a value a such as h(a) = b
when b is known beforehand, and a hash function
is considered safe against it if the probability of
finding a value a that fits this condition is 1
2n
, where
n is the length in bits of the output of h (so 2n is the
total amount of possible h outputs).
• The length of the output of h and h′ is n and m,
respectively.
• The two algorithms are totally independent, so an
attacker cannot obtain any information from either
of them using the cryptanalysis of the other.
Thereby, the double pre-image attack consists in finding
a c′i such as h(c
′
i) = h(ci) and h
′(c′i) = h
′(ci). The
probability of finding this value is 1
2n
· 1
2m
= 1
2n+m
,
because both condition need to be met simultaneously.
If the attacker intercepts r different messages authorized
to access the same entry, then the probability of a
successful attack goes up to r · 1
2n
· 1
2m
= r
2n+m
because
every message authorized and intercepted provides a new
target for a double pre-image attack, and all the attacks
can be made in parallel to maximize the probability of
success. This growth does not compromise security in any
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sense because any r possible is some orders of magnitude
smaller than 2n+m.
Choosing two hash functions h y h′ whose output’s size
n and m are considered safe, and for which there are not
any known algorithm that can reduce the complexity of a
pre-image attack, then our system is safe against that kind
of attack.
6.2. Security against update interception
In order to improve the operation of a Pro-active message’s
DTN, nodes spread routing information updates among
the network during the update phase by sending pairs
(j, Ekj (Ij)) from the Entries Set to other nodes. This is
a delicate situation, because an attacker that intercepts this
transmission can obtain lots of entries of the ES.
The first thing the attacker has to do is to find the
pair that contains the identifier j of the entry he wants
to compromise. Next, the attack consists of breaking
the ciphering provided by the symmetric key ciphering
algorithm E, because there is no way to obtain the key kj ,
which is stored in the AHS and has not been transferred
anywhere.
If the chosen E algorithm is safe, the probability of
a successful attack is 1
2n
where n is the size of the key
kj used to cipher the information (so the attack consists
in trying with all possible combinations of n bits to find
the key). Thereby, we can conclude that the system is safe
against these kind of attacks and that nodes can send data
from the ES without compromising the security of the
network.
6.3. Compromising the node
This is the worst possible case. In this scenario, an
attacker compromises the infrastructure of a node and
wants to access all routing information of the RIDB. In
this situation, the success of the attack is dependent upon
acquiring Pro-active messages with authorization to access
all the information. A situation like this is improbable and
can compromise the security of any access control system.
The attacker tries to compromise all entries ofES using
the data that can find in sets AHS and ES. The data
from the AHS is not useful to the attacker unless he has
intercepted some messages. When the attacker intercepts
a message i with a routing code ci that is authorized to
access Ij then this entry can be compromised. In that case,
the attacker can use ci and the non-secret hash algorithms
h and h′ to calculate h(ci) and h′(ci) and access Ij using
the algorithm explained in Section 5.
Although the system is not safe against an attack of this
type, Identity based Access Control makes the success of
the attack harder. Storing the information cyphered with a
key that it is not present in the node forces the attacker
to obtain the key using a different method, sniffing the
network traffic or waiting until an authorized message
arrives the node.
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6.4. Security results
We can conclude that Identity based Access Control for
Pro-active Message’s DTN makes the network safe against
routing code forgery and update interception and message
interception attacks in the active adversary mode. Thanks
to Identity based Access Control, an attacker cannot create
a malicious message with a routing code that compromises
the security of information stored in a node by accessing it
without permission.
Furthermore, nodes can easily spread updates of the
routing information among the network safely, because an
attacker that intercepts one or more of these updates cannot
be able to decrypt it nor to access the needed keys. This
contribution improves both the security of the network and
the performance of its operation.
Even in the worst-case scenario attack, a compromised
node where the attacker gains full control of the system,
our proposal would make the success of the attack harder,
and it would force the attacker to wait until the interception
of some authorized messages before being able to access
any cyphered information.
7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To test the feasibility of our proposal, and to evaluate its
operation and its performance, we have tested Identity
based Access Control on a specific application. In this
section, we will present the chosen application and
examine the most important implementation decisions
taken during the development of a proof-of-concept
software of our system. Finally, we will provide some
conclusions obtained from the proof-of-concept.
7.1. Scenario of application: PROSES
The year 2020 will mark a turning point in the field
of European air traffic management (ATM) and control,
as the next evolution in ATM is expected to become
fully operational and deployed. The Single European Sky
(SES) initiative will unify the heterogeneous air traffic
control models used by each country, transforming the
European airspace into a single integrated air management
scenario. In order to achieve this, the system will require
an unprecedented level of connectivity between all the
participants to support the massive increase in data
exchanges taking place between the terrestrial, aerial
and satellite platforms. In conclusion, a sort of “aerial
ATM Internet” is being created, composed of mobile and
collaborative nodes that will integrate distributed and/or
geographically sparse services.
The scenario where we have tested and monitored
our system is based on PROSES (PROtocols for the
Single European Space) [27]. In PROSES, a network of
heterogeneous nodes, which in this case are aircraft and
ground control centers, along with unmanned vehicles,
for non-critical data exchange is created. This network
is based on Pro-active message’s DTN, and a dozen of
different applications with varied routing needs coexist.
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The authors deployed a small-scale version of the
proposed delay tolerant network scenario in a small
aerodrome near Seville at the end of 2011 [28], where
two days of flying tests were performed using two mobile
nodes, located in an RC fixed-wing aircraft and an
RC helicopter, and a stationary ground station. Statistics
about the scenario and the characteristics of the network
utilisation were collected and used here to study the
feasibility of the presented Identity based Access Control
system inside PROSES environment. The average number
of messages carried by every node is 10, with an average
size of 10KB. There are 10 different types of information
with sizes between 50KB and 4MB. Field tests showed that
smaller pieces of information are more commonly used
than bigger pieces of information, in 82.5% of the cases
access takes place with information between 100KB and
750KB. Connectivity windows in PROSES are typically
located between 20 and 30 seconds.
7.2. Implementation decisions
In order to implement a Pro-active message’s DTN, we
have modified MobileC [29], a standard IEEE FIPA
compliant mobile agent’s platform to allow its use as
the central element of a Pro-active message based DTN.
MobileC was chosen because it is specially designed
for real-time and resource constrained applications, and
because it provides support to the execution of mobile
code. The modifications are based in the usage of the
libraries OpenSSL [30], Libxml2 [31] and Raptor [32].
The most important modifications are:
• Change of approach: MobileC is no longer a mobile
agent’s platform, now is an element that can send,
receive and route Pro-active messages with its own
routing code.
• Implementation of a module that performs the
neighbour discovery. This module is very necessary
to use the platform in DTN environments where
the neighbour’s list of any node could change very
quickly.
• Inclusion of the Identity based Access Control
system presented in this paper, implemented using
the algorithms described in Section 5.
The chosen hash and symmetric key cypher algorithm
are: h = SHA2-256, h′ = SHA1, E = AES-256 CBC.
This choice was made taking into account that h and h′
must be independent algorithms. Besides, the size of the
key of E and the output of h was considered in order to
avoid having to truncate or pad these values. Notice that
they’re related because h(ci) is used as a key of algorithm
E when cyphering and decrypting Eh(ci)(kj).
7.3. Implementation of the routing information
We have defined a collection of routing information related
to different applications, which is a set of files with RDF
statements. Each statement can be stored in an unprotected
form, which means it is a public entry formatted as plain
text, or can be protected by our system, which means that
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it has to be decrypted before it is accessed. Both public and
protected entries are stored in the corresponding file using
Base64. This is a way to assure that both kinds of entries
are accessed the same way and the results and differences
of execution’s times obtained in experimentation are not
affected by the parsing process.
Box 1 shows an example of a public entry and a
cyphered one.
< r d f : D e s c r i p t i o n r d f : a b o u t =” h t t p : / /
t e s t . com / pub l ”>
< f i e l d : d a t a 1>Value1< / f i e l d : d a t a 1>
< f i e l d : c y p h e r e d> 0 < / f i e l d : c y p h e r e d>
< / r d f : D e s c r i p t i o n>
< r d f : D e s c r i p t i o n r d f : a b o u t =” h t t p : / /
t e s t . com / p r i v ”>
< f i e l d : d a t a 2>h+ Iy3 +RwDfn / qcPEF2Y5oA=
< / f i e l d : d a t a 2>
< f i e l d : c y p h e r e d> 1 < / f i e l d : c y p h e r e d>
< / r d f : D e s c r i p t i o n>
Box 1: Example of cyphered and unencrypted entries.
7.4. Deployment
Figure 7 shows the deployment diagram of the developed
proof-of-concept software. As seen above, Pro-active
MobileC is made up of three main elements: the neighbour
discovery module, the Identity based Access Control
system and the original MobileC core. The two sets
AHS and ES are stored in two different files, and
there is a collection of RDF [33] files that contain
the routing information. These files cannot be accessed
directly by Pro-active messages, and they need to send an
“information request” to the platform when they want to
consult the information.
Identity based 
Access Control
Pro-active MobileC
MobileC
Neighbour 
Discovery
Access Control's Sets
ES AHS
Information
Pro-active
message
RDF
Figure 7. Deployment diagram of Pro-active MobileC.
7.5. Test environment
The laboratory environment where we have tested our
system is a machine with an Intel Pentium 4 3.3GHz
processor of 32 bits and 512MB of RAM memory and a
GNU/Linux O.S. with a 3.3.2 kernel. The node is equipped
with the Pro-active MobileC platform, and it is connected
to a network interface through which it receives and sends
Pro-active messages.
We have modelled the incoming traffic of Pro-active
messages we injected in that node in the basis of
the statistics exposed in the previous paragraph and
information obtained in PROSES field tests. Figure 8
shows a schema of the operation of the test.
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Routed messages
Laboratory node
Monitored node
PROSES network
Messages
Figure 8. Schema of the proof-of-concept tests.
In order to obtain conclusive results, we have routed
2,200 messages, and we have measured the routing time
spent by each one. Half of these messages were routed
using public entries, while the other half was routed using
protected entries, routing codes of those messages which
have a structure like the one shown in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Structure of message’s routing code
Input: destination: Message ultimate destination.
identifier: Identifier of the information.
Output: nextHop: Where to forward the message.
1: information = getInformation(identifier, this)
2: // Process the information to decide the next hop
3: // ...
4: return nextHop or ∅
Long explanations Comma splice The sizes of the
entries range included: 50KB, 100KB, 200KB, 300KB,
500KB, 750KB, 1MB, 2MB, 3MB, 4MB and 5MB.
Measurements allowed us to obtain average routing times
and their corresponding standard deviations. We can
evaluate the impact of our system by analysing the routing
time taken by each message according to the size and the
type of information accessed during routing.
7.6. Results
To obtain Figure 9, we have grouped the samples according
to the size and the type (cyphered or unencrypted) of the
accessed information. We can observe how the overhead
included by our access control system becomes linear as
the size of the information increases. Also, we can see
that the time needed for routing when the accessed entry is
cyphered is slightly longer (6.67% in average) than when
it is unencrypted.
Figure 9. Routing time (ms) according to the size and the type
of the accessed entry.
The obtained average routing times and its standard
deviations for access to unencrypted information are
shown in Table III. Table IV shows the same information
for access to cyphered entries. In both cases, we have
calculated the average number of milliseconds per KB
taken during access by dividing the Average routing time
(ms) by the Size of the entry (KB).
The amount of time spent per KB is especially important
to be able to see the performance’s trend of the system for
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Size Average routing Standard Time per
(B) time (ms) deviation KB (ms/KB)
50K 326.25 6.20% 6.53
100K 299.99 6.00% 3.00
200K 285.08 5.79% 1.43
300K 290.33 5.77% 0.97
500K 457.31 4.56% 0.91
750K 629.03 6.34% 0.84
1M 771.05 4.63% 0.75
2M 1434.15 12.72% 0.70
3M 2346.62 13.60% 0.76
4M 3092.70 8.63% 0.76
5M 3636.26 8.16% 0.71
Table III. Routing times when the accessed entry is
unencrypted
larger sizes of information. Almost all operations executed
during the access of the information are independent of
its size. Thereby, we can see that when the information
accessed is small, each KB is very costly due to the
overhead of these operations. However, from 750KB the
time per KB is stabilized around the 70-80 ms/KB (a few
milliseconds more for the cyphered entries).
Figure 10 shows the routing time according to the size
of the cyphered entry of the most commonly used sizes
in PROSES, from 100KB to 750KB. We can see that
the needed routing time is stabilized during the first half
and then grows linear during the second half. Considering
Size Average routing Standard Time per
(B) time (ms) deviation KB (ms/KB)
50K 335.61 5.88% 6.71
100K 306.35 5.78% 3.06
200K 308.06 6.02% 1.54
300K 307.91 5.64% 1.03
500K 523.24 6.45% 1.05
750K 667.38 5.68% 0.89
1M 912.76 5.12% 0.89
2M 1465.50 9.99% 0.72
3M 2369.94 11.64% 0.77
4M 3181.93 13.75% 0.78
5M 3978.00 9.69% 0.78
Table IV. Routing times when the accessed entry is cyphered
Figure 10. Routing time (ms) according to the size of the entry.
the size of PROSES’ connectivity windows (10-30s),
differences of 0.3s cannot be considered as significant,
even if an increment of 0.3s represents a 120% growth in
routing time (note that, in the same interval, the size of the
entry has grown a 650%).
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The average routing time without accessing any routing
information is 4.8ms (with a huge standard deviation of
39%). That time grows to 0.3-0.6s when messages access
cyphered entries of 100-750KB. Considering the PROSES
characteristics previously explained, we conclude that the
overhead introduced by our system is totally acceptable.
10 messages that access cyphered entries of less than
1MB can be routed in less than 10 seconds, one half of
the smallest connectivity window. Identity based Access
Control system could be used even if the size of the used
information or the number of queued messages grows, e.g.
10 messages that access entries of 4MB can be routed
in 31.8s, and up to 22 messages that access entries of
500-1MB can be routed in less time than the minimum
connectivity window.
Therefore, we can say our proposal is feasible, and its
performance is good enough to be used in the studied
DTN application, besides, as explained in Section 6, the
usage of Identity based Access Control for Pro-active
message’s DTN would make the PROSES network safe
against routing code forgery and update interception.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Most of DTN routing algorithms do not take into account
the close relationship between applications and the way
these use the network. DTN based on Pro-active messages
solve that problem by allowing applications to define their
own routing code and the information they need to consult
during routing. This way, every application can chose
differently the best way to get to its destination, and can
even decide how to spread over the network creating copies
of the messages. This is what we call “application driven
routing”.
In this paper, an access control system for routing
information in a Pro-active message’s based DTN has been
presented. The fundamental contribution of this proposal
lies in the usage of the own identity of the routing code
that tries to access the information in order to decide if it is
authorized. This system uses two different hash functions,
one to identify the routing code that requests access to
information, and the other to, together with a symmetric
cyphering algorithm, protect the information and grant its
confidentiality and integrity.
This proposal will not only improve security in Pro-
active messages based DTN, but also make the whole
paradigm become feasible. Thanks to Identity based
Access Control, an attacker will not be able to create a
malicious message with a routing code that compromises
the security of information stored in a node by poisoning
it. Furthermore, nodes can spread updates of the routing
information among the nodes of the network safely. In
the worst-case scenario attack, our proposal would not
provide security if an attacker compromised the whole
infrastructure of the attacked node. However, it would
make the success of the attack harder, forcing the attacker
to acquire (by intercepting authorized messages) the keys
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to access cyphered information. So it provides a last line of
defence even in a situation where all other systems fall.
The application of our proposal in a specific context,
PROSES, allowed us to evaluate the feasibility and the
performance of the Identity based Access Control system.
In conclusion, the performance of the system is good
enough to be used in the Pro-active message’s DTN
scenario.
We also studied the characteristics of our proposal and
other access control systems in order to analyse if they can
be applied to the environment of our research, Pro-active
message’s DTN. We found that only Identity based Access
Control system can be used properly in that environment
due to its unique characteristics and design.
Future lines of research include, but are not limited
to: widening the access control system to make it usable
out of DTN scope; developing a mechanism to spread the
information and enhance the operation of the network; and
improving the system to allow a posteriori modifications
of the set of rules used to decide which codes are
authorized or not to access information. It is also possible
to use the same principles used here to control mobile
agent’s access to local resources in DTN scenarios.
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